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Abstract—In this paper, we build a speech privacy attack
that exploits speech reverberations generated from a smartphone’s
inbuilt loudspeaker1 captured via a zero-permission motion sensor
(accelerometer). We design our attack, called Spearphone2, and
demonstrate that speech reverberations from inbuilt loudspeak-
ers, at an appropriate loudness, can impact the accelerometer,
leaking sensitive information about the speech. In particular, we
show that by exploiting the affected accelerometer readings and
carefully selecting feature sets along with off-the-shelf machine
learning techniques, Spearphone can successfully perform gender
classification (accuracy over 90%) and speaker identification
(accuracy over 80%). In addition, we perform speech recognition
and speech reconstruction to extract more information about the
eavesdropped speech to an extent.
Our work brings to light a fundamental design vulnerability in
many currently-deployed smartphones, which may put people’s
speech privacy at risk while using the smartphone in the
loudspeaker mode during phone calls, media playback or voice
assistant interactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s smartphones contain a plethora of sensors aiming
to provide a comprehensive and rich user experience. Some
common sensors used in modern smartphones include infrared,
accelerometer and gyroscope, touchscreen, GPS, camera and
environmental sensors. A known security vulnerability as-
sociated with smartphone motion sensors is the unrestricted
access to the motion sensor readings on most current mobile
platforms (e.g., the Android OS), essentially making them
zero-permission sensors. Recent research [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6] exploits motion sensors for eavesdropping on keystrokes,
touch input and speech. Since the Android mobile operating
system has a market share of 75.16% worldwide and 42.75%
in the United States [7], this security vulnerability is of
extreme concern especially in terms of speech privacy.
Expanding on this research line in significant ways, we
investigate a new attack vulnerability in motion sensors that
arises from the co-located speech source on the smartphone
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1Inbuilt loudspeakers are different from the earpiece speaker that is used
to listen to incoming calls
2Spearphone denotes Speech privacy exploit via acclerometer-sensed
reverberations from smartphone loudspeakers
(smartphone’s in-built loudspeakers). Our work exploits the
motion sensors (accelerometer) of a smartphone to capture
the speech reverberations (surface-aided and aerial) generated
from the smartphone’s loudspeaker while listening onto a voice
call or any media in the loudspeaker mode. These speech
reverberations are generated due to the smartphone’s body
vibrating due to the principle of forced vibrations [8], behaving
in a manner similar to a sounding board of a piano. Using this
attack, we show that it is possible to compromise the speech
privacy of a live human voice, without the need of recording
and replaying it at a later time instant.
As the threat of exploiting smartphone’s loudspeaker privacy
using motion sensor arises due to co-location of the speech
source, i.e., the phone’s loudspeaker, with the embedded
motion sensors, it showcases the perils to a user’s privacy in
seemingly inconspicuous threat instances, some examples of
which are described below:
• Remote Caller’s Speech Privacy Leakage in Voice Calls: The
proposed attack can eavesdrop on voice calls to compromise
the speech privacy of a remote end user in the call. A
smartphone’s loudspeaker can leak the speech characteristics
of a remote end party in a voice call via its motion sensors.
These speech characteristics may be their gender, identity
or even the spoken words during the call (by performing
speech recognition or reconstruction).
• Speech Media Privacy Leakage: In our attack, on-board mo-
tion sensors can also be exploited to reveal any audio/video
file played on the victim’s smartphone loudspeaker. In this
instance, the attacker could exploit motion sensors, by log-
ging the output of motion sensors during the media play, and
learn about the contents of the audio played by the victim.
This fact could also be exploited by advertisement agencies
to spam the victim by using the information gleaned from
eavesdropped media content (e.g., favorite artist).
• Voice Assistant Response Leakage: Our proposed threat may
extend to phone’s smart voice assistant (for example, Google
Assistant or Samsung Bixby), that communicate with the
user by reaffirming any given voice command using the
phone’s loudspeakers. While this action provides a better
user experience, it also opens up the possibility of the
attacker learning the voice assistant’s responses.
Considering these attack instances, we explore the vulner-
ability of motion sensors to speech reverberations, from the
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smartphone’s loudspeakers, conducted via the smartphone’s
body. We also examine the frequency response of the motion
sensors and the hardware design of the smartphones that
leads to the propagation of the speech reverberations from the
phone’s loudspeaker to the embedded motion sensors.
Our Contributions: We study the speech privacy threat that
exploits the response of embedded motion sensors to the
speech reverberations generated by the smartphone’s loud-
speakers. We carefully use existing techniques to quantify the
threat by performing gender, speaker and speech classification
under multiple setups. Our contributions are three-fold:
1) A New Speech Privacy Attack System: We propose a
novel attack, Spearphone (Section IV), that compromises
speech privacy by exploiting the embedded motion sen-
sor (accelerometer) of a smartphone. Our work targets
speech reverberations (surface-aided and aerial vibrations)
produced by the smartphone’s loudspeakers, rather than
the phone owner’s voice which is directed towards the
phone’s microphone. This includes privacy violation of
remote caller on a voice call (live at remote end but still
played through phone owner’s loudspeakers), user behavior
by leaking information about media played on phone’s
loudspeakers or the smartphone’s voice assistant’s response
to a user query (including the issued command) through the
loudspeakers in a preset voice.
Accelerometers are not designed to sense speech as they
passively reject air-borne vibrations [8]. Thus, it is very
hard for an attacker to eavesdrop on speech using ac-
celerometer readings. Indeed, prior work on motion sensor
exploit for compromising speech required the speech to
be replayed via external loudspeakers while a smartphone
(with embedded motion sensors) was placed on the same
surface as the loudspeaker. In contrast, our work leverages
the speaker inbuilt in the smartphone to provide a funda-
mentally different attack vector geared towards eavesdrop-
ping on speech reverberations. (a detailed comparison with
prior work is provided in Section II). Spearphone is a three-
pronged attack that performs gender, speaker and speech
classification using accelerometer’s response to the speech
reverberations, generated by the victim’s phone’s speakers.
2) Attack Design and Implementation: As a pre-requisite
to the Spearphone attack, we perform frequency response
analysis of motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope)
to determine the sensor most susceptible to our attack
(Section III). We find accelerometer to be the most recep-
tive and therefore design our attack based on its readings
associated with smartphone loudspeaker’s speech signals.
The attack is designed to work on the Android platform,
facilitated due to the “zero-permission” nature of motion
sensors. We execute the attack by carefully using off-the-
shelf machine learning and signal processing techniques
(Section V). By using known techniques and tools, we
believe that our attack implementation has a significant
value as it can be created by low-profile attackers. Although
we use standard methods to keep our attacks more acces-
sible, we had to address several technical challenges like
low sampling rates of the motion sensors and appropriate
feature set selection as discussed below and in Section V-E.
3) Attack Evaluation under Multiple Setups: We evaluate
Spearphone under multiple setups mimicking near real-
world usage of smartphone loudspeakers (Section VI). We
show that Spearphone can perform gender and speaker
classification requiring as low as just one word of test
data with an f-measure ≥0.90 and ≥0.80, respectively,
which shows the threat potential of the attack. The speech
classification result also shows the possibility of speech
identification, essentially turning it into a loudspeaker for
the attacker. Our evaluation and datasets capture the three
threat instances as they all require the speech signals to be
output by the phone’s loudspeakers.
Technical Challenges Addressed in Our Work: We an-
alyzed the motion sensors’ response to speech reverberations
under low sampling rates and show that accelerometer is more
sensitive than the gyroscope. A detailed comparison of this
behavior is provided in Section III. To choose the best feature
set that can accurately perform gender, speaker and speech
classification, we compared the performance of the frequency-
time domain features with Mel-frequency Cepstrum Coeffi-
cient features (Section V-E). For a more comprehensive speech
classification and recognition, we built a word isolation and
keyword search technique that could work with low sampling
and fidelity sensors. We also implemented the keyword search
scheme with a limited training set to approximate a harder
setting for the attack (Section VI-G1).
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK
The embedded motion sensors (i.e., accelerometer and gy-
roscope) are useful in supporting various mobile applications
that require motion tracking or motion-based command. How-
ever, they also bring potential risks of leaking user’s private
information. Due to the nature of the motion sensors, they
can capture the vibrations associated with users’ movements
such as typing on the phone’s keyboard. This could cause
sensitive information leakage on mobile devices [9], [3], [10],
[5], [11]. For instance, TouchLogger [3], TapLogger [11]
and Accessory [10] utilize the accelerometer and gyroscope
embedded on smartphones to infer keystroke sequence or
passwords when the user inputs on the smartphone’s keyboard.
TapPrints [9] further shows that the tap prints on the smart-
phone touchscreen can be characterized by accelerometers and
gyroscopes on the smartphone to identify users. In addition,
(sp)iPhone [5] shows that the vibrations generated by typing
on a physical keyboard can be captured by a nearby smart-
phone’s accelerometer to derive the user’s input.
Additionally, it is necessary to consider speech privacy in
various daily scenarios (e.g., private meetings, phone conver-
sations, watching or listening to media). In order to prevent
unintentional listeners from overhearing the speech, traditional
methods apply sound-proof walls for closed conference room
to confine the speech within the room. Besides, microphone
access on a smartphone is subjected to a high-level permission
to prevent exploits by adversaries. In order to prevent potential
snooping via smartphone’s built-in microphone, people can
simply deny any app’s microphone permission if they are
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TABLE I: Spearphone vs. prior speech privacy motion-sensor attacks/studies
Speech Origin Propagation Medium Type of Vibrations Motion Sensor Leaked Information Effect Present
Gyrophone (1) Loudspeaker Shared solid surface
Surface-aided speech 
vibrations
Gyroscope
Speech replayed via external 
loudspeakers
YES
Speechless
(1) Loudspeaker 
(2) Phone owner talking into his phone
(1) Shared solid surface 
(2) Air
(1) Surface-aided 
speech vibrations 
(2) Air-borne speech 
propagation
(1) Gyroscope, 
Accelerometer 
(2) Gyroscope, 
Accelerometer
(1) Speech replayed via 
external loudspeakers 
(2) Live human speech
(1) YES 
(2) Likely NOT
Spearphone
(1) Remote caller talking to phone owner, 
(2) Media played on phone, 
(3) On-board voice assistant’s response
Smartphone body
Surface-borne & aerial 
speech reverberations
Accelerometer
(1) Remote caller’s speech 
(2) Media played on phone 
(3) On-board voice assistant’s 
response
(1) YES 
(2) YES 
(3) YES
not actively using a specific feature that requires microphone
usage. The motion sensors, on the other hand, are usually
freely accessible, meaning any application needs zero permis-
sion to access them. Additionally, MEMS sensor attributes
and structures could be affected by noise and other sounds,
indicating the potential to leak the smartphone user’s private
speech information.
Existing studies have shown that background noise affects
MEMS sensors and degrades their accuracy [12], [13], [14].
The reason is that the MEMS structure can be resonant to
some parts of frequencies of the sound vibrations surrounding
the phone. However, due to the low sampling rate of motion
sensors (e.g., 200Hz on most smartphones), its capability of
snooping speech sound is often ignored or underestimated.
However, the recent work shows that embedded MEMS mo-
tion sensors could reveal speech information [6], [15], [2].
Specifically, Gyrophone [6] shows that gyroscope is sensitive
enough to measure acoustic signals from an external loud-
speaker to reveal speaker information. Accelword [15] uses
smartphone’s accelerometer to extract signatures from live
human voice for hotwords extraction.
Speechless [2] further tests the necessary conditions and
setups for speech to affect motion sensors for the speech
leakage. [2] concluded that motion sensors may indeed be
influenced by external sound sources as long as the generated
vibrations are able to propagate along the surface to the
embedded motion sensors of the smartphone, placed on the
same surface (surface-aided). [2] also showed that aerial
vibrations of speech, such as those produced by the vocal
tract of live human speakers speaking in the microphone of
the phone, do not impact its motion sensors. Pitchin [16]
presented an eavesdropping attack using embedded motion
sensors in an IoT infrastructure (having higher sampling rate
than a smartphone motion sensor) that is capable of speech
reconstruction. They leveraged the idea of time-interleaved
analog to digital conversion by using a network of motion
sensors, effectively boosting the information captured by the
motion sensors due to increased sampling rate obtained by
sensor fusion.
The above studies, however, focus on studying the pos-
sibility or necessary conditions for making the embedded
motion sensors respond to the external sound sources (e.g.,
loudspeaker and live human voice). Our work explores the
possibility of revealing the speech played by the smartphone’s
built-in speakers from the phone’s own motion sensors. This
setting is related to a large number of practical instances,
whose privacy issues are still unexplored.
Compared to the related work in [6], we found that the
accelerometer performs much better than gyroscope when
picking up the speech reverberations. Moreover, the study in
[6] examined the speech from an external loudspeaker, which
produces much stronger sound/vibration signals and only
targeted the local speaker’s speech using their smartphone.
Smartphone loudspeakers lack the wide range of frequency
response compared to an external loudspeaker (with woofers),
especially at low frequencies. Since the speech signals that
produce vibrations consist of low frequencies, our threat model
is much weaker than the one used in [6]. Our work is not
restricted to just surface-aided speech vibrations as it exploits
both surface-aided and aerial vibrations that are propagated
within the smartphone’s own body. Thus, we believe [6]
presents a threat model that is extremely favorable to the
attacker but potentially too restrictive to work in the real world.
A summary of related work vs. our work is provided in Table
I.
In summary, in this paper, we identify and dissect live
speech and media instances in which the speech privacy attack
through motion sensors works, whereas a recent study [2]
concluded these sensors to be “speechless” in most other
setups (e.g., humans speaking into the phone, or when the
loudspeaker does not share the same surface as the phone).
We elaborate our detailed attack model in Section IV.
III. MOTION SENSORS VS. SPEECH REVERBERATIONS
Sound is a vibration that typically propagates as a pressure
wave through a medium (e.g., air). As shown in Figure 1, when
a sound is played by a mobile phone, the phone loudspeakers
generate sound vibrations. Compared to the vibrations being
transmitted in the air (air-borne propagation), the phone body
also provides a pathway for propagating the resulting sound
reverberations to the accelerometer and gyroscope, which are
embedded in the phone (Figure 1). These embedded motion
sensors are designed for sensing the physical motion of
the phone, which enables various applications (e.g., fitness
tracking and gaming) but they also suffer from exploitation
(due to zero-permission nature) that draws serious security and
privacy concerns.
A. Accelerometer Frequency Response
An accelerometer is an electro-mechanical device for mea-
suring acceleration which can be either static (e.g., gravity) or
dynamic (e.g., movement/vibration). The MEMS accelerom-
eter can be modeled as a mass-spring system. An external
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Fig. 1: Speech reverberations, propagating within the smartphone’s
body, impact the motion sensors
acceleration force causes movement of the tiny seismic mass
inside fixed electrodes, causing a capacitive electrical signal
change which can be measured as acceleration value [17].
Spearphone aims to capture the speech from the smart-
phone’s built-in loudspeaker by leveraging the readily avail-
able motion sensors. To measure the frequency response of
the accelerometer to the built-in loudspeaker sound, we play
a specifically-designed signal and collect the accelerometer
readings with a smartphone (e.g., Samsung Galaxy Note 4).
The smartphone sensor sampling rate is set to its maximum
limit of 250Hz and placed on a wood table during experiment.
We generate a chirp sound signal sweeping from frequency
0Hz to 22kHz for 5 minutes and play the sound through the
smartphone’s built-in loudspeaker at maximum volume. This
frequency range covers most of the sound range that a smart-
phone built-in loudspeaker is able to play. The amplitudes
of the accelerometer in Appendix Figure 7(a) show that the
accelerometer has a strong response to the sound frequency
ranging from around 100Hz to 3300Hz. This is because the
built-in loudspeaker and the accelerometer are on the same
device, and the sound gets transmitted through the smartphone
components causing vibrations. Moreover, the spectrogram in
Appendix Figure 7(b) further shows that different frequency
sounds cause responses at the low frequency points of the
accelerometer and generate aliased signals [6], which can be
expressed by the equation fa = |f−N ·fs|, where fa, f , fs are
the vibration frequency of the accelerometer, sound frequency
and the accelerometer sampling rate. N can be any integer.
Therefore, the accelerometer can capture rich information from
the sound but with aliased signals in low frequency.
B. Gyroscope Frequency Response
A gyroscope is a motion-sensing device used to measure
device’s angular velocity. The main principle of the MEMS
gyroscope is the Coriolis effect, which causes an object to
exert a force when it is rotating. This force can be measured
by a capacitive-sensing structure supporting the vibrating
mass to determine the rate of rotation. Appendix Figure 8
shows the gyroscope response to the 0 − 22kHz frequency
sweeping sounds from the built-in speaker. Gyroscope has
observable response in the frequency range 8 − 9kHz and
18− 19kHz and thus can capture some sound information in
these frequency ranges. However, compared to accelerometer,
gyroscope has a weaker response to the built-in loudspeaker’s
sound. In particular, the gyroscope shows subdued response
in the frequency range 0 − 4kHz (i.e., for audio sampled at
8kHz), which is more often used in practical scenarios such as
telephone calls and voice messages and the speech sound lies
in this frequency range. Given this property of gyroscope, we
only focus on using the smartphone’s accelerometer to capture
the speech information.
To verify this observation, we captured a single speaker’s
voice in both Gyrophone [6] setup and our proposed setup
as described in Section V and implemented in Section VI.
The gyroscope readings’ spectrum from Gyrophone setup and
the accelerometer readings’ spectrum from Spearphone setup
are shown in Appendix Figure 9. We observed no indication
of speech on Appendix Figure 9a spectrum while we noticed
the speech reverberations corresponding to word “Oh” around
3.5 second mark in Appendix Figure 9b further validating our
findings. We also further noted that Gyrophone setup involved
a shared conducting medium that transferred the speech vibra-
tions from the external loudspeaker to the smartphone’s motion
sensor. Thus, the capacity of motion sensors like gyroscope to
sense these speech vibrations depends upon the nature of the
shared surface. In contrast, Spearphone setup detects speech
reverberations, traveling within the smartphone’s body, thus is
independent of any such external causes.
IV. ATTACK OVERVIEW AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we will describe Spearphone threat model
and provide an overview of Spearphone (Figure 2) that
showcases the motion sensor exploiting speech reverberations.
The threat model is based on [6], [2] where the embedded
smartphone motion sensor readings are recorded in presence
of speech in multiple setups.
A. Spearphone Threat Instances
In Spearphone, we assume that the smartphone’s loud-
speaker is being used to output any audio. Some examples
of Spearphone threat instances are described as follows:
• Voice Call: In this threat instance (Figure 2a), the victim
is communicating with another person and listening in
the loudspeaker mode (i.e not using the earpiece speaker
or headphones). We assume the phone loudspeaker is at
the maximum loudness level to produce strongest speech
reverberations (although we also test the effect of lower
volumes and validate the threat under such conditions). The
phone could be hand-held or placed on a solid surface like
a table. In this threat instance, the attacker is able to capture
reverberations on the victim’s phone, generated in real time
during the phone call.
• Multimedia: We also believe that the live call instance could
extend to situations where human speech is produced by
smartphone’s loudspeakers while playing a media file. While
the content of the media may not be private, an attacker
can get some confidential information about the victim (for
example, Snapchat videos, preferred music). Advertisement
companies could use this information to target victims
with tailor-made ads, inline with the victim’s preferences.
Malicious websites can also track the motion sensor data
output in background while media content is played in the
foreground. It could be a breach of privacy if a person’s
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Bob’s speech
Bob’s speech emitted via 
loudspeaker on Alice’s phone
Bob
Alice
Speech vibrations from 
Alice’s phone’s loudspeakers 
affecting the accelerometer
Attacker receiving 
accelerometer log from 
Spearphone
Gender/Speaker/Speech classification 
from received accelerometer logs
Alice and Bob in an audio call
Alice’s phone
Attacker
Spearphone exploiting 
accelerometer output
(a) Threat instance involving a voice call
Spearphone exploiting 
accelerometer output
Speech identification from 
Alice’s phone(media file or 
assistant’s response)
Spearphone transmits 
accelerometer readings 
to the attacker
Alice’s phone playing 
(audio/video) file on loudspeaker
Alice queries phone’s assistant for 
retrieving personal information
The assistant responds 
via speaker the result 
of Alice’s query
Ok, Google! 
What’s on my 
schedule today?
Multimedia on 
phone’s loudspeaker
Alice
Alice’s phone
(b) Threat instance involving multimedia/voice assistant use
Fig. 2: An overview of the proposed attack depicting possible threat instances and the attack mechanism
habits or behavior patterns are exposed to the attacker. This
information could be used against the victim to discriminate
them from jobs, insurance purpose, financial benefits, etc.
This threat instance is depicted in Figure 2b.
• Assistant: Most modern smartphones come with an inbuilt
voice assistant for performing intelligent tasks. The voice
assistant often confirms the user’s command to ensure the
desired action. It makes the process user-friendly and gives
the user a choice to modify or cancel the current process.
If the phone assistant uses the inbuilt phone loudspeakers,
any response from the phone assistant is played back via
these loudspeakers and can potentially affect the motion
sensors, in turn exposing the intent of the user to an attacker
exploiting the motion sensors (Figure 2b).
B. Attacker’s Capabilities
The attacker in our threat model has similar capabilities
as elaborated in previous literature [2], [6]. The attacker can
fool the victim into installing a malicious application or a
malicious website could track the motion sensor readings in
the background via JavaScript while the unsuspecting victim is
browsing. Michalevsky et al.[6] analyzed the sampling rate of
motion sensors, as permissible on various browser platforms
and found out that only Gecko-based browsers (e.g. Firefox)
do not place any additional limit on the sampling rate of the
motion sensors. Thus, the malicious attack through Javascript
on a Gecko-based browser would work similar to a malicious
application installed on the Android platform. These malicious
applications can be designed to get triggered for specific
threat instances described previously and can start logging
the motion sensor output. The output can then be transmitted
to the attacker where the attacker can extract confidential
information.
The degree of threat posed by our attacker in Spearphone is
measured by the extent of breach in speech privacy. Spear-
phone attempts to compromise speech privacy by performing
gender, speaker, and speech classification. From an attacker’s
perspective, gender classification helps the attacker to nar-
row down the set of speakers for unidentified speech sam-
ples thereby increasing the recognition accuracy for speaker
identification. Speaker classification helps the attacker with
more context about the communicated speech (in addition
to revealing the identity of one of the parties involved in
a private voice call) while speech classification reveals the
contents of the speech itself that may be considered private
between the two communicating parties. More specific privacy
concerns for each type of classification/leakage are provided
below. We also limit our threat model to utilize a finite set of
words (a closed dictionary) although it could be expanded by
identifying individual phonemes contained in the speech.
• Gender Classification (Gen-Class): Gender classification
can cause a privacy compromise in scenarios where the
gender of a person may be used to target them in a harmful
manner. For example, advertising sites could push spam
advertisements of products aimed towards a specific gender
[18]. It can also be used to discriminate against a particular
gender as shown in [18] where job search advertisements
were gender biased. Certain oppressive societies put restric-
tions on particular genders and may use gender classification
to target individuals in potentially harmful ways.
• Speaker Classification (Spk-Class): Speaker classification
involves identifying a speaker that could lead to privacy
leakage of the communicating parties in a voice call. For
example, an attacker can learn if a particular individual was
in contact with the phone owner at a given time. Another
example could be a person of interest under surveillance by
law enforcement who is in contact with the phone owner.
It could also lead to leakage of the entire phone log of the
phone owner.
• Speech Classification (Speech-Class): Spearphone aims to
learn the actual words transmitted via the phone’s speaker
during the attack. In order to perform Speech-Class, we
build a classification model based on a finite word list.
Speech features from the obtained sensor readings for
isolated words are compared against the labeled features
of the word list by the classification model that provides
the attacker with a possible rendition of the actual spoken
word. We also study the feasibility of performing speech
reconstruction by isolating possible words from natural
speech and then using word recognition on isolated words
to reconstruct speech.
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C. Attack Setup
The environment of the victim plays an important role in our
threat model. In our model, we study the speech reverberations
generated from the smartphone’s inbuilt speakers. Therefore,
we exclude any external vibration generating source such as
external loudspeakers studied in [2], [6]. Our threat model
assumes the victim’s phone is the only device that is present
in the environment and the only vibrations present in the en-
vironment are generated by the victim’s smartphone speakers.
To test the threat instances, we categorize two setups where
the victim’s phone speaker can impact the embedded motion
sensors.
• Surface Setup: In this setup, the phone is kept on a flat
surface with its screen facing up. This setup may be used
in Voice scenario where the victim places the phone on a
table while talking to someone with the phone on speaker
mode. This setup also mimics occurrences when phone is
put on a table, countertop etc. in Multimedia scenario and
Assistant scenario.
• Hand Held Setup: The victim may also hold the phone
in hand while in Voice scenario, playing a media file in
Multimedia scenario or using their phone’s assistant in
Assistant scenario. In our threat model, we assume that
while holding the phone in hand, the victim is stationary
with no hand or body movement.
Lastly, the attacker in this threat model is not in the physical
vicinity of the intended victim. The attack happens through a
previously installed malicious application or a rogue website
that records the motion sensor data output during relevant time
and sends it to the attacker. The attacker can examine the
captured data in an off-line manner and use signal processing
along with machine learning to extract relevant information
about the intended victim.
V. ATTACK DESIGN
Spearphone uses a malicious application installed on the
victim’s phone (or through JavaScript running in a browser on
the phone) to record motion sensor readings while the phone is
on speaker mode. The malicious application is triggered when
the victim either places a phone/video call, attempts to listen
to a media file or interacts with the phone assistant.
Spearphone relies on the loudspeakers of the smartphone
to generate reverberations from received speech signals. We
tested the ear piece speaker, that is normally used to listen to
incoming phone calls (a target for our attacker). Appendix
Figure 10 shows the spectrum of the accelerometer log,
recorded in the presence of an incoming voice call, that used
the ear piece speaker. The call volume was set at maximum
and the phone was placed on a solid surface. Appendix Figure
10 does not show any footprints of speech, indicating incapa-
bility of the ear piece speaker on LG G3 to produce speech
reverberations strong enough to impact the accelerometer.
A. Motion Sensor Recording
We designed an Android application that mimics the behav-
ior of a malicious attacker (Section IV). On start, the applica-
tion immediately begins logging motion sensor readings. After
a delay of five seconds from the start, we play a single word
on a separate thread in the application while it is recording
motion sensor data. This step partially mimics the act of the
callee’s speech generated during a phone/voice call or the
playing of media file on the phone via the inbuilt loudspeakers.
Our use of isolated words can also be extended to continuous
speech, but we do not aim to implement a complete speech
recognition system limiting only to showcase the threat posed
by embedded motion sensors. Upon completion, we process
the output file containing motion sensor readings as detailed
in subsequent subsections.
B. Identifying Speech Areas
Once the attacker obtains motion sensor output from the
malicious application, he needs to extract speech areas for
performing Gen-Class, Spk-Class and Speech-Class as per
Section IV-B. Since we used isolated words in our attack,
each speech sample contains one instance of a spoken word.
As gyroscope did not display a noticeable presence of speech
in the spectrum of its readings (Section III), accelerometer
is the only motion sensor that is considered in Spearphone.
To extract speech from accelerometer recordings, we trim off
the beginning five seconds and ending two seconds of the
recordings to compensate for the initial delay before playing
the isolated word and the ending finger touch for pressing the
“Stop” button to pause the motion sensor recordings.
Since we see maximum response along the Z axis for
accelerometer’s reaction against speech (Section III), we try
to determine the speech areas in the Z axis readings and use
corresponding areas for the X and Y axes. To determine the
area of speech in the Z axis readings for accelerometer, a
sliding window of size 100 (samples) is used. Since different
words have varying lengths of utterance, we use duration of
the shortest word as the size of sliding window. We calculate
variance in each window to determine the behavior of the
sensor within that time duration. A higher variance in the
readings indicates presence of an external motion (speech
vibrations). We extract the bounds of window with maximum
variance as the area of sensor reading influenced due to
presence of speech.
C. Feature Set for Speech Classification
Once we have extracted accelerometer readings that contain
speech, we need speech features for Gen-Class, Spk-Class and
Speech-Class that are described here. Mel-Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCC) are widely used in audio processing as
they give a close representation of human auditory system.
While MFCC features are sensitive to noise, our threat model
(Section IV) assumes minimal interfering noise.
Time-frequency domain features are another option to clas-
sify a signal. These features consist of statistical features of the
signal in time domain such as minimum, maximum, median,
variance, standard deviation, range, absolute mean, CV (ratio
of standard deviation and mean times 100), skewness, kurtosis,
first, second and third quartiles, inter quartile range, mean
crossing rate, absolute area, total absolute area, and total signal
magnitude averaged over time. Frequency domain features are
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calculated by converting accelerometer readings from time
domain to frequency domain using Fast Fourier transformation
(FFT). The FFT coefficients were used to derive energy, en-
tropy and dominant frequency ratio that are used as frequency
domain features in time-frequency features.
D. Evaluation Metrics
We use the following metrics to evaluate the performance
of Spearphone attack: Precision, Recall, and F-measure.
Precision indicates the proportion of correctly identified sam-
ples to all the samples identified for that particular class.
In other words, it is the ratio of number of true positives
to number of elements labeled as belonging to the positive
class. Recall is the proportion of correctly identified samples
to actual number of samples of the class. It is calculated as
the ratio of number of true positives to number of elements
belonging to the positive class. F-measure is the harmonic
mean of precision and recall. For perfect precision and recall,
f-measure value is 1 and for worst, it is at 0.
E. Design Challenges
1) Low Sampling Rates: Operating Systems like Android
place a hard limit on the data output rate for motion sensors, in
order to conserve the battery life of the device. This behavior
helps in freeing in valuable processing and memory power.
This fact, however, makes it harder to turn the on-board
motion sensors into acting as a microphone for capturing
speech. Compared to an audio microphone with a sampling
rate ranging from 8kHz to 44.1kHz, motion sensors become
severely limited in their sampling rate (120Hz on LG G3,
250Hz on Samsung Galaxy Note 4). In addition, the on-board
loudspeakers may be limited in their capacity of reproducing
the audio in its true form resulting in several missing frequen-
cies outside the loudspeaker’s range. Thus, we need to choose
the motion sensor that can capture most of the speech signal.
We compared the frequency response of both accelerometer
and gyroscope in Section III. The accelerometer response in
Section III-A shows us that it was able register motion (acous-
tic vibrations) for the audio frequency range 100 − 3300Hz.
Comparing with gyroscope’s response in Section III-B, we
see that the gyroscope’s response is considerably weaker than
accelerometer in the human speech frequency range. Thus, we
make use of accelerometer in our experiments.
2) Feature Set Selection: We compared both MFCC fea-
tures and time-domain frequency features to determine the
most suitable feature set that would accurately classify the
speech signals captured by the accelerometer. We use the met-
rics as described in Section V-D and the following classifiers:
Support Vector Machine (used in [6]) with Sequential Minimal
Optimization (SMO), Simple Logistic, Random Forest and
Random Tree (variants of decision tree classifier used in [15]).
An initial experiment was conducted using the TIDigit word
list [19] for using isolated words on LG G3 smartphone in
Surface scenario. Our results indicated that time-frequency
features outperformed MFCC features using 10-fold cross
validation for all four classification algorithms. This result,
combined with the fact that time-frequency features were
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Fig. 3: Distribution of salient time-frequency features for Gen-Class.
proven to be efficient in [15], led us to decide upon using
it in our attack for Gen-Class, Spk-Class, and Speech-Class.
Among the classifiers, we noticed random forest outperform-
ing other classifiers using the time-frequency features, hence
we use it in the rest of our experiments (Appendix Figure 11
and Figure 12). A full set of our time-frequency features is
provided in Appendix Table VIII.
Salient Time-frequency Features: We further studied the dis-
tribution differences of time-frequency features for Gen-Class,
Spk-Class, and Speech-Class, because not all the features
exhibit the same capability for differentiating the sound for
various classification purposes. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of a subset of the most salient features in box plots, which
works best for Gen-Class. In particular, the identified feature
set includes the second quartiles (Q2), third quartiles (Q3),
signal dispersion (SigDisp), mean cross rate (MCR), ratio
of standard deviation over mean (StdMeanR) and energy,
along different axes. Similarly, we also identified the most
effective time-frequency features for Spk-Class, and Speech-
Class (boxplots presented in Appendix Figures 13 and 14).
3) Complete Speech Reconstruction: Performing speech
reconstruction with the information captured by low sampling
rate and low fidelity motion sensors may not be sufficient to
recognize isolated words. Moreover, it is unrealistic to generate
a complete dictionary (i.e., training profile) of all the possible
words for the purpose of user’s full speech reconstruction.
To address these issues, we extracted the time-frequency
features from the accelerometer readings, which exhibit rich
information to distinguish a large number of words based on
existing classifiers (e.g., Random Forest and Simple Logistic).
We performed word isolation by analyzing the spectrogram
obtained from accelerometer readings under natural speech
and calculated the Root Mean Square of the power spectrum
values. We developed a mechanism based on searching the
keywords (e.g., credit card number, targeted person’s name
and SSN) and only used a small-sized training set to reveal
more sensitive information while ignoring the propositions,
link verbs and other less important words.
VI. ATTACK EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
Smartphones: We conducted our experiments using three
different smartphone models: LG G3, Samsung Galaxy S6 and
Samsung Note 4. The experiments were performed in a quiet
graduate student laboratory on a table with hardwood top for
Surface setup, while the Hand Held setup was created by two
participants holding the phone in their hands.
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• Operating System: We focused mainly on phones with the
Android mobile operating system as it does not require
explicit user permission to obtain access to motion sensor
data. In contrast, the iOS mobile operating system (from
version 10.0 onwards) requires any application wishing to
access motion sensor data to state its intent in the key
“NSMotionUsageDescription". The text in this key would be
displayed to the user describing why the application wants
to access the motion sensor data. Failure to state its intent
in the above described manner results in immediate closure
of the said application. Also, as pointed out in Section I, the
sizeable market share of Android (worldwide and the US)
allows us to treat the threat posed to smartphones operating
on this platform with extreme concern.
• Sensors: The accelerometer embedded in the smartphones
used in our experiments had an output data rate of 4-4000
Hz and an acceleration range of ±2/± 4/± 8/± 16g. The
liner acceleration sensitivity range are 0.06/0.12/0.24/0.48
mg/LSB. A quick comparison with the LSM6DSL motion
sensor chip used in the latest Samsung Galaxy S10 smart-
phone indicates similar properties for the accelerometer.
Word Datasets: TIDigits Dataset: We used the subset of
TIDigits corpus ([19]). It contains 10 single digit pronunciation
from “0” to “9” and 1 additional pronunciation “oh”. It
contains 5 male and 5 female speakers, pronouncing the words
twice. The sampling rate for the audio samples is 8kHz.
PGP words Dataset: We also used a pre-compiled word list
uttered by Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in a natural
environment. The list consisted of fifty-eight words from PGP
words list and they were instructed to record the words in a
quiet environment. This data collection activity was approved
by the university’s IRB and the participants had the choice
to withdraw from the experiment at any given time. We used
4 male and 4 female Amazon Turk workers’ audio samples
(44.1 kHz sampling frequency). PGP word list is used for clear
communication over a voice channel and is predominantly
used in secure VoIP applications.
Speech Processing: We used Matlab for processing the
accelerometer output performing feature extraction as detailed
in Section V. We used Weka [20] as our machine learning tool
to perform gender, speaker and speech classification on the
extracted speech features. In particular, we test the attack with
Random Forest classifier that outformed other classifiers as
noted in Section V-E. We used default parameters for the clas-
sification algorithm and the detailed configurations are listed
in Appendix Table VI. We used both 10-fold cross-validation
and the training and testing methods for classification. 10-fold
cross-validation partitions the sample space randomly in 10
disjoint subspaces of equal size, using 9 subspaces as training
data and retaining 1 subspace as testing data. For training and
testing method, we split the dataset into training set and test
set with the split being 66% of the dataset being used for
training and remaining 34% being used for testing.
In our attack, the attacker collects the training samples for
building the classifier, which is unique for each device. Since
our dataset is not large (limited to 58 words for PGP words
and 22 words for TIDigits), we believe that it does not indicate
a significant overhead for the attacker to procure the training
TABLE II: Gender and speaker classification (10 speakers) for
Surface setup using TIDigits and PGP words dataset using Random
Forest classifier and time-frequency features
10-fold cross validation Test and train
TIDigits PGP words TIDigits PGP words
Gender classification
Samsung Galaxy S6 0.91 0.80 0.87 0.82
Samsung Note 4 0.99 0.91 1.00 0.95
LG G3 0.89 0.95 0.85 0.95
Speaker classification
Samsung Galaxy S6 0.69 0.70 0.56 0.71
Samsung Note 4 0.94 0.80 0.92 0.80
LG G3 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.95
samples for each device targeted under the attack. Most other
motion sensor attacks to our knowledge (e.g., [9], [3], [10],
[5], [11], [5]), including Gyrophone, have similar or even more
strict training requirements for the attacker.
Effect of Noise and User Movement: In our threat model, the
loudspeaker resides on the same device as the motion sensors
thus any reverberations caused by the device’s loudspeaker
would impact the motion sensors. [2] and [8] claimed that
external noise in human speech frequency range, traveling over
the air, does not impact the accelerometer. Hence, any such
noise in the surrounding environment of the smartphone would
be unable to interfere with the accelerometer’s readings.
The speech dataset used in our experiment, PGP words
Dataset, was collected from Amazon Mechanical Turk work-
ers recording their speech in environments with varying degree
of background noise. This dataset thus imitates the speech
samples that the attacker may be faced with in the real-world,
such as during our attack instances involving phone calls.
B. Gender and Speaker Classification
(Surface Setup)
1) Surface Setup using TIDigits: The results for the Surface
setup, where the victim’s phone is placed on a surface such as
a table, using TIDigits dataset is shown in Table II for Gen-
Class and Spk-Class. We observe that the attack was able to
perform Gen-Class with a substantial degree of accuracy f-
measure > 0.80 with the attack being particularly successful
on Note 4 as demonstrated in Table II. As a baseline, the
scores are significantly better than a random guess attacker
(0.50) indicating the success of the attack in this setup. For
Spk-Class, we note that the attack is more successful on LG
G3 and Note 4 when compared to Galaxy S6 with f-measure
> 0.60. A random guess attack performance is significantly
worse at 0.10 (for 10 speakers) when compared to this attack.
2) Surface Setup using PGP words dataset: The results
with PGP words dataset for Surface setup, are depicted in
Table II for Gen-Class and Spk-Class. Evaluating the attack
against a random guess attack (0.50), we observe that the
reported f-measure for the attack for all three phone models
was more than 0.70 in both 10-fold cross-validation and train-
test model. The attack on LG G3 boasted an f-measure of over
0.90 consistently across all the tested classification algorithms
leading to the conclusion that threat measure of Spearphone
when performing Gen-Class may indeed be harmful in this
setup. Table II show Spearphone’s performance when Spk-
Class was performed using the PGP words dataset.
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TABLE III: Gender and speaker classification (10 speakers) for Hand
Held setup using TIDigits and PGP words dataset using Random
Forest classifier and time-frequency features
10-fold cross validation Test and train
TIDigits PGP words TIDigits PGP words
Gender classification
Samsung Galaxy S6 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.70
Samsung Note 4 0.81 0.87 0.77 0.88
LG G3 0.99 0.95 1.00 0.95
Speaker classification
Samsung Galaxy S6 0.33 0.34 0.26 0.29
Samsung Note 4 0.73 0.75 0.61 0.70
LG G3 0.98 0.93 1.00 0.95
For a 10-speaker classification model, a random guessing
attack would give us an accuracy of 0.10. However, in our
tested setup, we were able to achieve much higher f-measure
scores with the attack on LG G3 achieving a score of almost
0.90. The attack on Galaxy S6 performed the worst among the
attacks on all phone models but still had a better f-measure
score of over 0.50 when compared to the baseline random
guess attack accuracy. These results lead to conclusion that
Spearphone threat is also significant while performing Spk-
Class in this setup.
We also performed binary classification for speakers by
using two classes “Targeted Speaker” and “Other”, that cate-
gorizes each data sample as either in the voice of the target
speaker or any other speaker. We used PGP words dataset
in our evaluation as it contained more words per speaker
compared to TIDigits dataset. Using Random Forest classifier
and 10-fold cross-validation, the mean f-score for this binary
speaker classification for LG G3 was 0.97, for Galaxy S6 was
0.90, and for Note 4 was 0.94.
C. Gender and Speaker Classification
(Hand Held Setup)
1) Hand-held Setup using TIDigits dataset: Using the
TIDigits dataset in Hand Held setup, we demonstrate the
performance of the Spearphone attack in Table III for Gen-
Class and Spk-Class. For Gen-Class, we observe that the
performance of the attack on LG G3 is much better when
compared to other devices for both 10-fold cross-validation
model and train-test model with overall f-measure being
approximately 0.70, which is again significantly better than
a random guess attacker (0.50). For Spk-Class, we see that
the scores of Galaxy S6 are worse when compared to LG G3
with Note 4 having scores in between these devices. The f-
measure values for LG G3 for Spk-Class are over 0.90 for
all the tested classifiers, for Note 4 these values are over 0.50
while Galaxy S6 values hover around 0.25. When compared to
a random guess attack (0.10), the attack on G3 is significantly
better while on Galaxy S6 it is slightly better.
2) Hand-held Setup using PGP words dataset: The Gen-
Class attack result is shown in Table III. The 10-fold cross-
validation model indicates that the f-measure value of the
attacker’s classifier for LG G3 is the best performer among all
three phone models. Similar to Surface, the attack performed
better than a random guessing attacker (0.50) while the per-
formance of attack was similar to the performance in Surface
TABLE IV: Effect of loudness on gender and speaker classification
accuracy using Samsung Note 4 for Surfacesetup using Random
Forest classifier and time-frequency features.
Volume Level
75%V olmax 80%V olmax V olmax
Gender
Classification
TIDigits 0.93 0.90 0.99
PGP word 0.78 0.95 0.91
Speaker
Classification
TIDigits 0.45 0.70 0.94
PGP words 0.54 0.79 0.80
setup. The attack’s evaluation for Spk-Class (Table III) shows
that the attack is able to perform speaker identification with
a high degree of precision for LG G3. The f-measure values,
however, drop for Note 4 while the performance is worst for
Galaxy S6. Thus, the attack’s performance, while still better
than a random guess attack (0.10), suffers a bit of setback for
Note 4 and more so for Galaxy S6. The binary classification
for speakers (previously described in Surface setup) shows that
the f-measure values when the smartphone is hand-held (Hand
Held setup) are similar to Surface setup. The f-measure score
averaged for 8 speakers with LG G3 was 0.97, for Galaxy S6
was 0.84, and for note 4 was 0.92.
D. Effect of Loudness
We further evaluate the impact of the smartphone speaker
volume on the performance of Spearphone. In particular, we
test the gender classification and speaker classification perfor-
mance of Spearphone when setting the smartphone speaker
volume to 100%, 80%, and 75% of the maximum volume.
Table IV presents the results of the test on Samsung Note 4
phone, when it is placed on the table (i.e. Surface setup). The
results show that while lower volume does impact the accuracy
negatively, the lower volumes still achieve very high accuracy
(i.e., 80% volume achieves 95% accuracy for gender classifica-
tion and 79% accuracy for speaker classification with the PGP
words dataset). Also, the results indicate that the lower volume
still causes significant privacy leakage, when compared to the
random guessing accuracy (i.e., 50% for gender classification
and 10% for speaker classification). Moreover, people tend to
use maximum volume in various scenarios to make the speech
clear and comprehensible to avoid missing any important
information [21]. The louder volume, while providing clearer
speech, would expose speech privacy more significantly via
our Spearphone attack. In addition, we believe that the quality
of the speakerphones on smartphones will improve over time
and there are also powerful speaker cases in use today that
can be physically attached to the phones [22], [23], and speech
leakage over such higher quality speakerphones could be more
devastating, even at lower volume levels.
E. Result Summary and Insights
The speaker classification accuracies for Note 4 and Galaxy
S6 are higher for PGP words dataset compared to TIDigits
dataset. This may be because PGP words dataset (sampled
at 44.1kHz) was recorded at a higher sampling rate when
compared to TIDigits (8kHz). This effect is not prominent
in LG G3 because the sampling rate of its motion sensors
is slightly lower (120Hz) than Note 4 or Galaxy S6 (around
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TABLE V: Speech recognition results for PGP words and TIDigits
datasets using Random Forest classifier and time-frequency features
on LG G3
10-fold cross validation Test and train
TIDigits PGP words TIDigits PGP words
Single Speaker 0.74 0.81 0.62 0.74
Multiple speakers 0.80 0.75 0.71 0.67
200Hz). The gender and speaker classification accuracies seem
to decrease a bit for the PGP words dataset in some instances.
We believe that due to some background noise present in
PGP words dataset, the accuracies may have been affected
negatively. The accuracies of LG G3 do not seem to be
impacted though, which we believe maybe due to its lower
sampling rate (making it less prone to data degradation).
Another interesting observation is that the Surface setup
overall produces better classification results than the Hand
Held setup. The minute hand motions in the Hand Held setup
may affect the motion sensor readings and degrade the per-
formance compared to the Surface setup where the phone is
stationary at all times. Because the hand motions result in
low frequency vibrations, we have applied a high-pass filter
to reduce such influence. Another possible explanation could
be the vibration absorption/dampening caused by the holding
hand. To further test this reasoning, we conducted experiments
with the Note 4 phone placed on a soft surface (i.e., soft
couch). The gender classification accuracy is 87.5%, which
is similar to the handheld scenario (87%), both of which are
lower than the hard tabletop scenario. This suggests vibrations
are possibly being absorbed by the hand to some degree. The
speaker classification results overall seem similar to speaker
classification using audio recordings [24]. This behavior may
be an indication that prominent speech features present in
audio vibrations are also picked up by the accelerometer, as
showcased by our experiments.
Comparing our results with prior work done by Michalevsky
et al. [6], we find that they achieved a best case gender
classification accuracy of 84% using DTW classifier on Nexus
4 which is lower than our best accuracy of almost 100% using
Random Forest classifier on Samsung Note 4 using the same
dataset (TIDigits). For speaker classification, we obtained a
higher accuracy of over 90% using Random Forest classifier
on Samsung Note 4 while speaker classification accuracy for
Micalevsky et al. [6] was only 50% for mixed gender speakers
using DTW classifier for the same dataset (TIDigits).
Natural Speech Dataset: While Spearphone achieves very
high accuracy for the isolated word data set (i.e., TIDig-
its/PGP words), we further evaluated the performance of
Spearphone with a more challenging natural speech dataset
(VoxForge [25]), which provides samples of sentences (10
words long on average) spoken by 5 male and 5 female
speakers, with 100 samples for each speaker. In particular,
for speaker classification, Spearphone achieves 91.3% with
LG G3 using Random Forest for 10-speaker classification
under 10-fold cross validation. The result is very similar to the
speaker classification with the isolated word datasets, which
indicates that the attack is significant in a practical natural
speech scenario.
F. Speech Recognition
We next demonstrate the feasibility of speech recognition
using Spearphone. We found that the G3 phone on a wooden
table surface exhibited better performance when revealing
speaker information. Towards this end, we utilized G3 on a
wooden table to investigate the feasibility of Speech-Class. We
compared the performance of using time-frequency features
with that of MFCC features, which are known to be popular in
the speech recognition and found that time-frequency features
give better classification accuracy than MFCC features. We
also noted that random forest classifier outperformed the other
tested classifiers, so we used Random Forest as our classifier
on time-frequency features.
1) Speech-Class for Single Speaker: TIDigits dataset:
Table V shows Spearphone’s accuracy of successfully recog-
nizing a single speaker’s 11 isolated digit numbers (TIDigits
dataset). For 10-fold cross validation, using time-frequency
features, we achieved an f-measure score of 0.74 with Random
Forest classifier. In comparison, a random guess attacker would
achieve an accuracy 0.09 for the tested dataset. Similar results
were obtained using train-test method for classification as in
Table V, though there was a slight decrease in recognition
accuracy.
PGP words dataset: We further experimented with PGP
words to explore how accurate Spearphone could recognize the
isolated words other than the digits. Table V shows the Speech-
Class results under 10-fold cross validation. By using the
time-frequency features, Spearphone achieved a much higher
f-measure score of 0.81 in recognizing words in a 58-word
list than digits. In comparison, the random guess accuracy was
only 0.02 for the dataset. The results of the train-test model
showed a slight decrease in performance.
2) Speech-Class for Multiple Speakers: There are plenty of
scenarios involving multiple people’s voices presenting on a
single phone such as conference calls via Skype. We further
studied the feasibility of speech recognition from multiple
speakers. In particular, we involve two speakers (one male;
one female). Table V also shows the f-measure scores when
recognizing digit numbers from the two speakers (multiple
speaker scenario). We got an f-measure score of 0.80 for the
TIDigits dataset while the f-measure score for PGP words
dataset, for multiple speaker scenario, was 0.75.
Gyrophone [6] also carried out the speech recognition task
by using TIDigits dataset and 44 recorded words. However,
they addressed a totally different attack setup where the sound
sources were from an external loudspeaker and can achieve
an accuracy of up to 0.65. Our results of speech recogni-
tion accuracy around 0.82 strongly indicate the vulnerability
of smartphone’s motion sensors to its own loudspeaker’s
speech. By combining the speech recognition and speaker
identification, Spearphone is capable of further associating
each recognized word to the speaker identity in multi-speaker
scenarios.
G. Speech Reconstruction (Natural Speech)
We have shown the capability of Spearphone to recognize
isolated words with high accuracy. To reconstruct natural
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(a) Isolating natural speech with digit string “0125”
(b) Isolating natural speech with sentence “Cottage cheese with chives is delicious”
Fig. 4: Illustration of the word isolation based on the RMS of the
accelerometer spectrum
speech, Spearphone performs Word Isolation and Key Word
Search, which first isolates each single word from the sequence
of motion sensor readings and then searches for sensitive num-
bers/words from isolated words based on speech recognition
introduced in Section VI-F.
1) Word Isolation: In order to reconstruct natural speech,
the words of the speech need to be first isolated from the
motion sensor readings and then recognized individually.
However, isolating the words from the low sampling rate and
low fidelity motion sensor readings is hard. To address this
challenge, we calculated the Root Mean Square (RMS) of the
motion sensor’s spectrum at each time point and then located
local peaks based on a pre-defined threshold to isolate each
word. Figure 4 illustrates an example of isolating a TIDigit
string (“0125”) and a PGP sentence (“Cottage cheese with
chives is delicious”). The motion sensor’s spectrograms were
converted to the amplitude RMSs at the right side of the figure.
Based on the derived amplitude RMS, the valleys between the
local peaks were detected to segment the critical words. We
observed that some propositions and link verbs (e.g., “with”
and “is”) could hardly be detected, but this drawback has
minimal effect on our results as these words do not affect the
ability to understand an entire sentence. We further evaluated
our word isolation method by testing 20 sentences containing
around 28 words per sentence, and achieved 82% isolation
success rate. By excluding the less important propositions and
link verbs, we achieve around 96% success rate.
2) Key Word Search: Besides word isolation, key word
search is also significant when addressing natural speech.
As it is hard to train all the potential words of a natural
speech beforehand, the adversary might be more interested
in the sensitive numbers/words (key words) (e.g., credit card
information, an important person’s name, SSN, etc.). The
marginal words such as propositions, link verbs and other less
important words can be ignored. Thus a limited-size dataset
may already be sufficient for the adversary to steal most
sensitive information.
After obtaining the isolated words, an adversary could
search for key words based on a pre-constructed training
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Fig. 5: CDF of the prediction confidence level for key words and
marginal words
model. In particular, Spearphone relies on the predication
probability returned by the training model as the confidence
level to filter the key word search results. Only the high
confidence level predictions are kept as speech recognition
results. Figure 5 shows the CDF of prediction confidence levels
when 2/3 PGP words are used as key words. We observed
that we could set a threshold to differentiate the keywords
from the marginal words based on the confidence level.
Further combination of word isolation and key word search to
reconstruct natural speech requires fine-grained segmentation
of the words and usage of Hidden Markov and other linguistic
models for word corrections. This work is beyond the scope
of our current paper and is an avenue for possible future work.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Attack Limitations: In our experiments, we initially put
the smartphone loudspeakers at maximum volume. Thus,
the speech from the smartphone’s loudspeakers was able
to produce the strongest reverberations in the body of the
smartphone, making maximum impact on the accelerometer.
In reality, the loudness of different phones varies among
different phone models and the loudness is also selective to
each user. Hence, we tested the effect of loudness on the
attack’s accuracy and found out that decreasing the volume
from maximum to 80% still allowed the attack to perform
gender and speaker classification with significant accuracy,
although at a lower accuracy compared to the full-volume
attack.
While our experiments tested two different datasets, they
are still limited to single word pronunciations and are limited
in size. However, single word accuracy can be extended to full
sentence reconstruction using language modeling techniques.
Moreover, TIDigits dataset, while relatively small, can still
be effective in identifying sensitive information that mainly
consists of digits. Personal information such as social security
number, birthday, age, credit card details, banking account
details etc. consist mostly of numerical digits. So, we believe
that the limitation of our dataset size should not downplay the
perceived threat level of our attack.
Our attack targeted accelerometers embedded in the smart-
phones that were sensitive to the inbuilt speakers. The re-
verberations from the speakers travel via the body of the
smartphone to the affected accelerometer. In most of the smart-
phones (including the smartphone models tested in this work),
the motion sensor chip resides on the motherboard while the
loudspeaker component is a separate unit [26]. However, all
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of these components are fitted in the same device tightly to
reduce the overall size (thickness) of the device, leading to
reverberations traveling from the loudspeaker component to
the motion sensor chip.
Low sampling rate was a challenge that we faced during
the implementation of our attack. Low sampling rate results in
fewer data points collected by the motion sensors that directly
impacts the accuracy of our attack. Resampling the obtained
data to a higher sampling rate does not increase the amount
of information contained in the collected data. To mitigate
this challenge, we compared the accuracy of a combination
of several feature sets and machine learning algorithms that
maximized the amount of extracted information from our
collected dataset.
Noise in the audio may be another limitation that would
negatively impact the classification results of our attack. We
have tried to take the noise factor into account by using Ama-
zon Turk workers to record our speech dataset that introduces
a natural level of background noise in the speech samples (that
were recorded in individual Amazon Turk worker’s environ-
ment). Another factor to consider is the hand movement of the
victim while holding the smartphone. Our attack experiment
involved placing the phone either on a surface or held station-
ary in hand. Both these setups keep the smartphone stationary.
However, they may not always be the case since the victim can
move around with the smartphone or perform hand motions
while holding the smartphone. Accelword [15] analyzed the
impact of hand/body movements on accelerometers embedded
in the smartphones and concluded that a cutoff frequency of 2
Hz would filter out the effect of these motions. Application of
such a filter could make the proposed attack compatible with
mobile setups, where the smartphone is not stationary.
Impact of Hardware Design: Spearphone uses the smart-
phone’s accelerometer to capture the speech of the inbuilt
loudspeaker. However, the specific hardware designs of the
smartphones of various vendors are different, which results
in the different capabilities of the smartphone to capture the
speech with accelerations. In particular, the speaker proper-
ties and the accelerometer specifications are different across
various smartphone models. The specifications of the speaker
and accelerometer of the three popular smartphone models are
summarized in Appendix Table VII.
The accelerometers of the three models are similar but the
loudspeaker of Galaxy S6 is less powerful than the others that
may account for lower accuracy results on S6, especially in
Hand Held where there is no contact between the smartphone’s
body and a solid surface so the reverberation effect may
be reduced. Besides, the positions of the speaker and the
accelerometer on the smartphone may cause the acceleration
patterns to respond to the same speech word differently. This is
because the reverberations caused by the sound may transmit
through different routes and get affected by different complex
hardware components. Appendix Figure 6 shows the motion
sensor specifications for some popular brands of smartphones3.
For example, the speakers of LG G3 and Note 4 are at the
back of the smartphone, which can generate different levels
3https://www.gsmarena.com/
of reverberations when placed on the table. In comparison,
Galaxy S6’s speaker is located at the bottom edge of its body,
thereby having a diminished effect when placed on the table.
In this work, we focused on speech reverberations from the
smartphone’s loudspeakers as the source of privacy leakage.
While previous works exploited speech vibrations from ex-
ternal speech sources, Spearphone leverages the leakage of
speech reverberations, that is possible due to forced vibration
effect within the smartphone’s body. These reverberations may
be surface-aided or aerial, or a combination of both. A laser
vibrometer could classify these reverberations, which will be
our future work.
Accelerometer Models: The three phone models tested in
this paper are embedded with the Invensense accelerometer as
summarized in Appendix Table VII. We further analyzed the
frequency response of another smartphone (Samsung Galaxy
S3), embedding the STMicroelectronics accelerometer chip,
to speech signals played via onboard loudspeaker. Our anal-
ysis suggests that the response is similar to the LG G3
(Invensense accelerometer) and both types of accelerometers
show the frequency range between 300Hz and 2900Hz. This
indicates that the STMicroelectronics accelerometer is picking
up speech reverberations similar to the tested Invensense
accelerometer. With the MEMS technology getting better and
the loudspeakers being louder and more refined with every new
generation of smartphone, we believe our attack should raise
more concerns about speech privacy from this perspective.
Potential Countermeasures: The design of any side channel
attack exploiting motion sensors is centered around the zero
permission nature of these sensors. To mitigate such attacks,
Android platform could implement stricter access control poli-
cies that restrict the usage of these sensors. In addition, users
should be made aware of the implications of permissions that
they grant to applications. However, a stricter access control
policy for the sensors directly affects the usability of the
smartphones. Even implementing the explicit usage permission
model by the applications often does not work since users do
not pay proper attention to the asked permissions [27]. They
often do not read all required permissions, and even when
reading, they are unable to understand the security implications
of granting permissions. Moreover, many apps are designed to
be overprivileged by developers [28].
In addition, due to signal aliasing, vibrations of a wide range
of frequencies are mapped non-linearly to the low sampling
rate accelerometer data. Both the higher frequencies and lower
frequencies contain the speech information. Thus, simply
applying filters to remove the upper or lower frequencies
cannot mitigate this attack.
A potential defense against Spearphone could also be set
up by altering the hardware design of the phone. The internal
build of the smartphone should be such that the motion sensors
are insulated from the vibrations generated by the phone’s
speakers. One way to implement this approach would be
to mask or dampen the vibrations leaked from the phone’s
speakers by surrounding the inbuilt speakers with vibration
dampening material. This form of speech masking would
prevent speech reverberations emanated from the phone’s
speakers, possibly without affecting the quality of sound
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generated by the speaker. Speaker isolation pads are already in
use in music industry in recording studios for limiting sound
vibration leakage [29]. Other solutions like [30] also exist
that seek to dampen the surface-aided vibration propagation
that may be useful in preventing leakage of speech vibrations
within the smartphone. Further work is necessary to evaluate
such a defensive measure against the threat studied in the
paper.
Complete Speech Reconstruction: Spearphone shows high
accuracy to recognize the isolated digits/words. When apply-
ing to complete speech reconstruction, we present the initial
success of isolating the words from the motion sensor readings
for natural speech and the key word search to reveal sensitive
information based on the limited training set. To reconstruct
complete speech by combining the word isolation and key
word search, further research is needed. For example, Hidden
Markov Model can be used with word isolation to improve
the segmentation of motion sensor readings for word. Further,
linguistic models can be applied to word corrections. We leave
this in our future work.
Language Identification: One possible extension of our work
could be the prospect of language identification. Language
identification has been performed on VoIP traffic by using
the length of the encrypted VoIP packets [31]. One plausible
scenario where language identification could be useful if the
attacker has prior knowledge about the language preferences
of the possible set of speakers to which the victim may
communicate. This knowledge can help the attacker to narrow
down the set of speakers. Furthermore, language can also be
linked to the possible geographical location of the targeted
speaker leading to privacy compromise.
Fusion of Sensors: The proposed attack exploited accelerom-
eter that has a limited sampling rate (imposed by the operating
system). It could perform better if the attacker could achieve
a higher sampling rate by overriding this limit that could
also be applied to gyroscope further improving the attack’s
performance, when combined with accelerometer’s output. We
leave it as future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel side-channel attack that compromises
the phone’s loudspeaker privacy by exploiting accelerometer’s
output impacted by the emitted speech. This attack can leak
information about the remote human speaker (in a voice call)
and the speech that is produced by the phone’s speaker. In the
proposed attack, we use off-the-shelf machine learning and
signal processing techniques to analyze the impact of speech
on accelerometer readings and perform gender, speaker and
speech classification with a high accuracy.
Our attack exposes a vulnerable threat scenario for ac-
celerometer that originates from a seemingly inconspicuous
source (inbuilt speakers) on the phone itself. This threat
can encompass several usage instances from daily activities
like regular audio call, phone-based conference bridge inside
private rooms, hands-free call mode and voicemail/messages
played on the phone. This attack can also be used to determine
a victim’s personal details by exploiting the voice assistant’s
responses transmitted through the speakers. We also discussed
some possible mitigation techniques that may help prevent
such attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Classifier Configurations
TABLE VI: Configurations of tested classifiers
Classifier Configurations
SimpleLogistic -I 0 -M 500 -H 50 -W 0.0
SMO
-C 1.0 -L 0.001 -P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V -1 -W 1 -K
-kernal PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C 250007
-calibrator Logistic -R 1.0E-8 -M -1 -num-decimal-places 4
RandomForest -P 100 -I 100 -num-slots 1 -K 0 -M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 1
RandomTree -K 0 -M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 1
B. Device Specifications
TABLE VII: The specifications of the speakers and motion sensors
for some popular brands of smartphones
Smartphone MotionSensor Output Data Rate
Phone Speaker
Location
LG G3 InvensenseMPU-6500 4-4000Hz Back
Samasung Galaxy
Note 4
Invensense
MPU-6515 4-4000Hz Back
Samsung Galaxy
S6
Invensense
MPU-6500 4-4000Hz Bottom Edge
LG G3 Note 4 Galaxy S6
Accelerometer
Fig. 6: The speaker and the sensor positions on the smartphones of
different vendors.
C. Accelerometer Response
(a) Amplitude for sound 0 - 22kHz (b) Spectrum for sound 0 - 22kHz
Fig. 7: Frequency response of the accelerometer along the z axis in
response to a frequency-sweeping sound played by the smartphone’s
built-in loudspeaker.
D. Gyroscope Response
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(a) Gyroscope reading (b) Spectrogram
Fig. 8: Frequency response of the gyroscope to 0 - 22kHz frequency
sweeping sound
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(b) Accelerometer readings’ power
density spectrum
Fig. 9: Spectrum comparison (z axis) for the speaker “MAE”
pronouncing the word “Oh” (TIDigits dataset) in [6] setup and
Spearphone setup.
E. Evaluation of the Ear Piece Speaker
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Time(s)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y(H
z)
104
Fig. 10: Spectrum of accelerometer (LG G3) with maximum call
volume on the ear piece speaker. An incoming voice call was initiated
where the caller uttered digits “0” to “9” and “oh”.
F. Comparison of Various Classifiers
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Fig. 11: Gender and speaker classification (10 speakers) for Surface
setup using TIDigits dataset
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Fig. 12: Gender and speaker classification (10 speakers) for Surface
setup using PGP words dataset
G. Time-frequency Feature List
TABLE VIII: The time-frequency features calculated from accelerom-
eter readings of X, Y and Z axis over a sliding window
Time Domain
Minimum; Maximum; Median; Variance; Standard deviation; Range
CV: ratio of standard deviation and mean times 100
Skewness (3rd moment); Kurtosis (4th moment)
Q1, Q2, Q3: first, second and third quartiles
Inter Quartile Range: difference between the Q3 and Q1
Mean Crossing Rate: measures the number of times the signal crosses the mean value
Absolute Area: the area under the absolute values of accelerometer signal
Total Absolute Area: sum of Absolute Area of all three axis
Total Strength: the signal magnitude of all accelerometer signal of three axis averaged of all three axis
Frequency Domain
Energy
Power Spectral Entropy
Frequency Ratio: ratio of highest magnitude FFT coefficient to sum of magnitude of all FFT coefficients
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H. Salient Features for Speaker and Word Classification
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Fig. 13: Illustration of the salient time-frequency features to differ-
entiate speakers.
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Fig. 14: Illustration of the salient time-frequency features to differ-
entiate words.
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